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A Glass Half Full: Indonesia-U.S. Relations in the Age of Terror

ANTHONY L. SMITH

The U.S. may be paying greater attention to Southeast Asia now than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War. Indonesia has assumed some prominence in the war against terrorism — both as a “model of moderation” in the Muslim world, and as a source of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked terrorism with presumed connections to Al-Qaeda. While there are examples of substantive cooperation between Indonesia and the U.S. in the war on terrorism, differences remain. The Bush Administration’s plan to restore military-to-military relations has floundered on objections from Congress. Indonesia has refused to support U.S. military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the general public in Indonesia remain distrustful of U.S. foreign policy. While Washington now sees Indonesia as critical to its goals, the relationship is heavily complicated and requires careful management.

Introduction

In July 2003 five U.S. F-18 Hornets ventured too far into Indonesian airspace over Bawean Island in the Java sea and locked onto the Indonesian F-16s sent to intercept them. That the U.S. Ambassador, Ralph “Skip” Boyce, was summoned by Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to explain the incident is not surprising. Ambassador Boyce promised that the U.S. Air Force would not fly over Indonesian land in the future without permission. However, below the level of cabinet, the incident ignited a heated debate. Some Indonesian members of parliament

used the opportunity to deliver anti-U.S. speeches, with some even calling for sanctions against the United States. A number of members also posited the theory that the United States was flexing its muscle out of displeasure over Indonesia's recent decision to purchase some Russian aircraft for the Indonesian Air Force. These politicians used the incident, it appears, to capitalize on anti-U.S. sentiment in the country to improve their political fortunes. The incident demonstrates the careful manner in which Indonesia-U.S. relations must be managed, particularly in light of an emerging distrust of American intentions amongst the Indonesian population.

This article touches on some of the key themes and incidents that have emerged in the Indonesia-U.S. relationship in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.¹ The impact of public opinion in Indonesia, keenly felt on the foreign policy process after the fall of Suharto, has been to constrain the actions of the Indonesian government in the types of support it can offer the United States. The Indonesia-U.S. relationship is complicated by distrust from the past (nationalist concerns) and suspicion that the U.S.-led war against terrorism is an attempt to advance American power and undermine the Islamic world (anti-colonial concerns). Some media commentators have spoken of a "pendulum" in Indonesia-U.S. relations, whereby there is both cooperation and discord in the relationship. U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have heightened sensitivities, as have pressures for accountability and human rights improvement. At the same time the Megawati government has cooperated with the United States in tackling the terrorist problem within Indonesia, especially after the terrorist attack in Bali in 2002.

Although the United States already regards Indonesia as strategically important in the war against terrorism, Indonesia is assuming a new relevance. The United States may now be paying more attention to Southeast Asia — with Indonesia featuring prominently — than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War. However, the U.S. government is hamstrung in the type of support that it can offer Indonesia, given constraints from the U.S. Congress on military-to-military relations, and rising anti-U.S. sentiments within Indonesia. Nevertheless, Indonesia is cited by U.S. officials as being crucial in the war on terrorism in two ways. First, Indonesia is viewed as a moderate Muslim majority country, whose toleration and democratization are hailed by Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense (and often the Bush administration's leading voice on Southeast Asia), as a "model of moderation."² In the aftermath of September 11, the U.S. obtained an important official condemnation from the largest Muslim country. Second, Indonesia has had its own problems with a "homegrown", but

externally linked, terrorist group known as Jemaah Islamiyah. Washington worries that lack of state capacity will mean that Indonesia will be seen by terrorist groups as a haven. In seeking to deny haven and sanctuary to terrorist groups, Indonesia is one of the countries mentioned by U.S. officials as a prime area of concern.

Indonesia-U.S. cooperation in the war against terrorism has been difficult since it first emerged as an issue in the relationship. The Indonesian authorities have made significant progress in addressing the terrorist problem, but until the Bali blast in October 2002, key members of the Megawati administration and the Indonesian military were arguing that there was no international terrorist problem in Indonesia. Despite these types of setbacks, as well as ongoing skepticism from the general public and leading parliamentarians about the war on terror, U.S. officials almost always speak in praise of cooperation with Indonesia. At least in official statements, the glass is always half full.

The Background

Indonesia has always been important in U.S. calculations of security in Southeast Asia, and generally in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. officials and commentators have consistently cited three factors for this. First, Indonesia's critical location vis-à-vis the Malacca Straits — vital for global shipping. Passage through Indonesia's waters allows access between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Second, Indonesia's population and territorial size, the largest in Southeast Asia, makes it the cornerstone of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Third, Indonesia was a partner during the Cold War in U.S. attempts to check communist influences in Southeast Asia. Since 11 September 2001, Indonesia has become important for another reason: it is considered a vital component in Washington's war against international terrorism.

For Indonesia, the United States has been a dilemma since independence. Fears linger in Indonesia about the alleged American interference in regional rebellions in the 1950s and the events of the counter-coup in 1965, which ushered Suharto to power and left around one million Indonesians — suspected leftists and communists, as well as many caught up in the fray — dead. Sukarno increasingly chose to isolate himself from the United States as part of his non-aligned movement, while for his successor, Suharto, the United States was the key to economic recovery. After President Suharto took formal power in Indonesia in 1966, Indonesia-U.S. relations were close for the remainder of the Cold War, given mutual concern over communist expansion, and Indonesia's continuing reliance on the United States as a major source of trade and investment. Indonesia is quietly content

with the general U.S. presence in the Asia/Pacific region. Rhetoric about global disarmament and a more equitable international order aside, and despite a vocal section of the Indonesian public that is distrustful of U.S. intentions, the government of Indonesia fundamentally sees the United States as a benign power, and a restraining hand on powers situated to the north.

However, as this writer has argued in the past, many commentators have over-simplified Suharto's foreign policy as being "pro-Western", or even that Indonesia was a U.S. "ally", glossing over the fact that Indonesia remained a non-aligned state with aspirations for leadership of the developing world.³ Links with the West, although critical for Suharto's Indonesia, were only part of Jakarta's foreign policy. Despite Suharto's realignment of Indonesia away from the communist bloc and towards the United States, this was only ever a marriage of convenience for both sides. Suharto's paranoia vis-à-vis the threat of communism even outlived the Cold War, and was the glue in the Indonesia-U.S. partnership during the Cold War years, when they otherwise may not have had much in common. Indonesia's stated foreign policy goal is, after all, to remove all extra-regional powers from its region. Indonesia's desire for regional leadership was at odds with the Pacific Ocean becoming an "American lake"; however, U.S. force presence in Asia has been regarded as an important stopgap measure. While Indonesia adhered officially to non-alignment and "equidistance" between the superpowers, Indonesia, even in the post-Cold War era, has rhetorically challenged the nature of the global order. Indonesia has sought reform of the Security Council, urged the United States and other nuclear powers to focus on the danger of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons (alongside vertical proliferation), and to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Furthermore, Indonesia's dictatorial regime, under Suharto, was not a good fit by the end of the Cold War given Washington's increasing agitation for liberal democratic reforms with the demise of the communist threat. Criticism over East Timor saw an open split emerge between Washington and Jakarta from the early 1990s, while Suharto began to openly consider military purchases from non-U.S. sources. In this sense, a dip in the Indonesia-U.S. relationship predates the fall of Suharto in May 1998, but ironically, Indonesia's democratization — something heavily promoted by Washington — has complicated the relationship and constrained Jakarta's room for manoeuvre. At the end of the Cold War, events were to drive a wedge between Indonesia and America, with a number of bilateral tensions surviving into the era of democratization. The relationship was stable until the 1990s, when

U.S. policies regarding human rights, particularly in East Timor, marked the beginning of open bilateral strains. In 1991 Indonesian troops gunned down more than 200 East Timorese near the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. In the midst of glaring international publicity, Washington cut military-to-military links the following year, and only partially restored them in 1995.

Indonesia's financial meltdown from December 1997 has had lasting political consequences. It generated both political change (Suharto left office in May 1998) and economic reform. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), offering one of its largest assistance packages ever, at US\$43 billion, insisted on fundamental economic changes, including an end to subsidies, trade barriers and the sale of assets to foreign buyers. Many Indonesians, although largely angry at the avarice and corruption of the Suharto family, saw the resulting economic pain as at least partly the fault of the West. With the turbulence of these changes fostering in Suharto's resignation, his successor, B.J. Habibie announced that there would be a referendum in East Timor in 1999. While East Timor gained independence as the result of this vote, terrible violence at the hands of military-sponsored militia groups followed. United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) programmes, only partially restored, were suspended once more. The Clinton administration also put enormous pressure on the Indonesian government to accept a multinational peacemaking force (INTERFET: International Force East Timor), under Australia's leadership, to enforce peace in East Timor. Many Indonesians resented that dependency on the IMF could be used, as they saw it, to force Indonesia to accept the will of the international community (or, specifically, that of Australia and America).

Subsequent pressure from the United States to hold the officers involved accountable for their crimes raised the spectre of large power interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs. It is evident that most Indonesians, from the élite down to the masses, have failed to understand the exact nature of East Timor's departure from Indonesia. Most are unable to grasp that East Timor was annexed illegally in 1975, and that the vote by the East Timorese to leave the Republic of Indonesia in 1999 was not fixed by the Australian government. In order to give the impression that East Timor is an exceptional case, the U.S. has repeatedly expressed its respect for Indonesia's territorial integrity — particularly in the cases of Aceh and Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya). Nonetheless, deep suspicions linger about America's ability to interfere in Indonesia, fears that converge with the instability and foreign interference in Indonesia's immediate post-independence era.

Relations in the “Reformasi” Era

Upon assuming the leadership of the country in 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as “Gus Dur”) announced a “look towards Asia” policy, and announced various ill-defined groupings of countries that included Indonesia, India and China, and sometimes Singapore and Japan. While Wahid’s personalized style often led to off-the-cuff foreign policy statements, the President was articulating, in a very important sense, Indonesian desires to counter U.S. influence — a sentiment that had developed within policy-making circles by the early 1990s.

On the back of U.S. pressure over East Timor, events in Palestine at the end of 2000 sparked a round of anti-U.S. demonstrations in Indonesia. The U.S. embassy in Jakarta closed for a short time. This closure drew criticism from the Wahid government — much of which was directed at the then U.S. Ambassador, Robert Gelbard — on the grounds that Gelbard was trying to tarnish Indonesia’s reputation. This incident, coupled with the Ambassador’s very public statements about East Timor and the need for accountability, saw a great deal of public comment about this “outspoken” ambassador. There was even a petition from parliament to have Gelbard removed. In the words of lower house (DPR) member Yasril Ananta Baharudin: “He has several times interfered in the country’s internal affairs.”⁴ Despite this rising sentiment, there is no evidence that the Wahid administration was behind any of the anti-U.S. protests, and Wahid himself even appealed for calm. Nearly a year later, when Wahid was replaced by his vice-president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Indonesia-U.S. relations were to enter a new phase.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Washington kept on track a previously scheduled visit by President Megawati for that month — at a time when air traffic was effectively shut down. The symbolism of the leader of the world’s largest Muslim nation touching down on U.S. soil and denouncing terrorism was considered by Washington to be of crucial importance. The Indonesian President denounced terrorism and expressed support for the United States. President Megawati’s visit also included the announcement of a generous US\$400 million trade-and-aid deal from Washington and the creation of the Indonesia-United States Security Dialogue. Yet it was clear that Indonesia’s support in the war against terrorism would be a mixed bag from Washington’s viewpoint.

A diplomatic row between the U.S. and Indonesia emerged in the aftermath of September 11 over the security of the American embassy in Jakarta. The embassy received a number of threats, while groups like Front Pembela Islam (FPI or Islamic Defenders Front) burned effigies in

front of the embassy grounds. The FPI also signed up *jihadi* (Islamic militants) to fight in Afghanistan (and later Iraq as well), and may have been able to get some of its members into these battlefields. Threats to the U.S. embassy came on the back of threats made against U.S. citizens almost a year earlier in the city of Solo, in which the Indonesian police had failed to do more than ask FPI to stop their “sweeping” operations. The Indonesian security forces were quite slow to respond to these threats, which demonstrated an unwillingness to rein in the radical fringe in the aftermath of September 11. A law was subsequently passed in Indonesia that made it illegal to make threats against embassies and burn effigies.

Many in Washington were disappointed when Megawati returned to Indonesia and stated that her support for the United States did not extend to the looming war in Afghanistan. While international news media exaggerated the extent of street protests in Jakarta (aimed at the U.S. and British embassies), and tended to suggest they represented wider public opinion, there was little room for Megawati to move. Megawati could not count on the support of the Indonesian population to back up the United States in the counterattack against Al-Qaeda, through an invasion of Afghanistan. Surveys confirm that the Indonesian public largely opposed America’s war in Afghanistan.⁵ First, many Indonesians surveyed were skeptical about the nature of the terrorist attacks. Hasyim Muzadi, the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, seemed to sum up opinion when he suggested that, without the evidence that Al-Qaeda was involved in September 11, retaliation could not be justified.⁶ Rumours circulated in the aftermath of September 11, particularly among Internet users in Indonesia, that Israeli intelligence was behind the attacks, and that all Jews were sent text messages to stay away from the World Trade Centre on September 11.⁷ Second, even when Osama bin Laden virtually confessed to the attacks, through various veiled statements to the media, there was no support for a U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Many political and religious leaders argued that bin Laden’s guilt should be determined in an international court, not through force of arms. Third, Megawati’s political opponents used the events surrounding September 11 to put pressure on her. The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI; Council of Ulama), a body set up by former president Suharto and with ongoing links to the opposition Golkar Party, even issued a *fatwa* (religious edict) for *jihad* against the United States.⁸ Vice President and leader of the Islamist United Development Party (PPP), Hamzah Haz, undermined his own president by suggesting in the midst of her visit to the U.S. that the September 11 attacks might “cleanse” the United States of its “sins”.⁹ He later met with the arrested head of the Islamist militia group

Laskar Jihad, Ja'far Umar Thalib, and visited the boarding school of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, head of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) — an Al-Qaeda affiliate. Hamzah Haz chose to make political mileage out of being seen to ignore the warnings of the international community. Megawati, as a woman and a nominal syncretic Muslim, has been vulnerable to the charge that she lacks Islamic credentials, and her opponents have indirectly tried to use this against her.

In Indonesia two overlapping themes generally feed into suspicion of U.S. motivations, especially as they relate to Afghanistan. For most Indonesians, Muslim and non-Muslim, there is a distrust of U.S. foreign policy by nationalist groups. The reported CIA involvement in attempts to undermine President Sukarno in the 1950s, and deep suspicions that the U.S. played a role in the counter-coup that took half a million lives in 1965–66, have left an indelible impression of U.S. meddling in Indonesian affairs. East Timor, hardships arising from the stipulations of the International Monetary Fund, and demands for accountability over human rights, are the latest manifestations. Also, a growing body of Muslim opinion in Indonesia believes that the United States, and the West in general, will intervene to defend Western interests or Christian populations, but fails to act when Muslims are in trouble. Generally this line was formed around the experience of East Timor, when in actuality the West has intervened a number of times on behalf of Muslim populations, for example, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and so on. Nonetheless, while many Indonesian officials view the U.S. military presence in the Asia/Pacific as benign, deep-seated suspicion about U.S. intentions still exists with regard to the Muslim world. Even moderates have expressed these types of views.

A major breakthrough in undermining terrorist operations in Indonesia was the arrest of Al-Qaeda operative and Kuwaiti citizen, Omar al-Faruq, in June 2002. Omar al-Faruq's revelations included: involvement in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in which churches were targeted in ten cities across Indonesia; an assassination attempt on Megawati; and plans for "large-scale attacks against U.S. interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, (the) Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam and Cambodia."¹⁰ However, many Indonesians dismissed stories of terrorists cells in Indonesia, including Omar al-Faruq's story which appeared in *Time* magazine, as a fiction. One prominent articulator of this view is the President's own sister, Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, who dismissed reports of radicalism within Indonesia as CIA "rumours" designed to undermine Islam and put Indonesia under U.S. control.¹¹ A leader of the NU, Salahuddin Wahid (brother of the former president of Indonesia), accused Washington of engaging in "propaganda tricks".¹²

Domestic constraints have undermined President Megawati's ability to act more decisively and coherently regarding the problem of domestic terrorism. Indonesia's equivocation and inability to arrest even a handful of suspected terrorists also caused alarm in Singapore and Malaysia where, in early 2002, cells of JI activists were arrested. The Singapore cell had planned a series of attacks, including one on the U.S. embassy in Singapore. Singapore asked Indonesia to arrest JI's spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and JI's operations leader, Hambali. While the latter remained at large in Indonesia and was eventually arrested in Thailand, in the Ba'asyir case, the Indonesian government argued that the abolition of the Suharto era Anti-Subversion Law made it legally impossible to arrest suspects without proper evidence (something that is possible in Singapore and Malaysia both of which have Internal Security Acts). In May 2002 Singapore's leadership made open reference to Indonesia as a haven for terrorist cells, causing anger in Indonesia, and a reluctance in government circles to be seen to be caving in to foreign pressure.¹³ This spat between Indonesia and Singapore was undoubtedly noted by U.S. officials. It is significant that Washington's approach to gaining the results it wants from Jakarta have been more genteel.

U.S. State Department officials, keenly aware of Indonesia's reluctance to acquiesce to "megaphone diplomacy", have, in contrast to Singapore's position, publicly praised the actions of the Megawati government. For example, on the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Ambassador Ralph Boyce thanked President Megawati and other Indonesian leaders for their stand against terrorism. Yet the embassy in Jakarta was shut down on the basis of information that a terrorist attack was probable. This event clearly demonstrates that whatever concerns Washington has about Indonesia's inability to rein in terrorist networks, it prefers to convey them through private channels.

Once the emotional reaction to foreign pressure died down after June 2002, more sober actions were possible. By this stage the debate over the U.S. war in Afghanistan had cooled, particularly when television images of the Northern Alliance liberating Afghanistan on the ground and Afghans celebrating the end of the Taliban were broadcast throughout Indonesia. The Megawati government stepped up cooperation with the U.S. in a number of ways. In early August 2002, U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, visited Indonesia and announced aid of US\$50 million over three years to assist Indonesia in counter-terrorist operations. Several prominent arrests were made in Indonesia, and the suspects delivered into U.S. custody. Prior to the Bali bombings, Indonesia had planned to introduce a new, more robust, anti-terrorism law to parliament — although, it is obvious that a tougher law was not

required to arrest some *jihadi*. In the years following Suharto's departure from office, Indonesia's two most notorious Islamist militia groups, FPI and Laskar Jihad, have been able to break the law with virtual impunity. The evidence against leaders and members in both cases is incontrovertible, and yet they seemed untouchable. Such a situation points more to a lack of political will to rein in such radical groups. However, leaders of both groups have subsequently been arrested for violations of the law, including Laskar Jihad leader, Ja'afar Umar Thalib, who is charged with inciting a crowd to riot against a church. Laskar Jihad disbanded about a week prior to the Bali blast, but made public its dissolution immediately afterwards.

On 12 October 2002, around 200 people were killed in Bali when Jemaah Islamiyah operatives bombed a popular tourist nightclub. Among the dead were 88 Australians. This event was the catalyst for Indonesia's belated attempt to arrest terrorist suspects. Newspaper polls revealed that many either blamed the Indonesian military (TNI) for the blast, or even an American plot to tarnish Islam. However, for Megawati's cabinet it was a dramatic demonstration that *jihadi* groups, no matter how small, are a real threat within Indonesia. Immediately after the blast the Indonesian cabinet announced that not only was there a terrorist problem in Indonesia, but that it was linked to Al-Qaeda. Such an announcement, made as soon as it was, may have undermined later attempts to persuade the public that there was evidence that Jemaah Islamiyah actually existed, that it did carry out the attack, and that it is linked to Al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, the government has been supported by NU and Muhammadiyah — Indonesia's largest and most important Muslim groups. It is critical, in terms of dealing with Indonesia's homegrown terrorist networks, to bring the mainstream Islamic groups on side.

Washington's Dilemma: Military-to-Military Relations and the Global War on Terrorism

On 31 August 2002, a convoy was attacked near Timika in Papua, and two Americans and one Indonesian were killed. Although the assailants are unknown, suspicion soon fell on the Indonesian military. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), assisting the Indonesian police in the case, concluded that the TNI (Indonesia's military) had produced fabricated evidence — in particular, a local army commander produced the body of an alleged "assailant" who could not have possibly been involved in the attack. The corpse produced had been dead for up to an hour prior to the attack itself, and had a medical condition making it impossible for him to walk freely through the forest. This incident is

one of a series of problems that has plagued the Bush administration's plan to restore some level of military-to-military linkages. The Timika incident proved to be the key factor in a decision by Congress to deny aid to the TNI.

The Bush administration, even prior to September 11, recognizing the importance of Indonesia within the Asia Pacific region, explored the possibility of re-establishing military-to-military cooperation.¹⁴ Isolation of the TNI had, after all, failed to bring about even the prospects for meaningful domestic reform of the TNI. When in 1999 the U.S. Congress voted to suspend military assistance, the Clinton Administration's Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, had articulated a list of reforms necessary for a reconsideration, including improvement of TNI professionalism in dealing with regional conflicts and the bringing to trial of TNI officers responsible for the post referendum East Timor violence.¹⁵ The Foreign Appropriations Bill 2000/01 of Congress was also amended in early 2000 to include the return of the East Timorese refugees from West Timor as another precondition. The death of three UN workers (including one American) in Atambua, West Timor, at the hands of TNI sponsored militias, brought added pressure for successful prosecution in this case.

America's war on terrorism has heightened interest in resuming military-to-military ties between the United States and Indonesia. The U.S. State Department has been aware for some time that bans on both IMET programmes and the sale of U.S. *matériel* have also been hugely unpopular within Indonesian society. They are regarded as a "stigma", and contribute to a widespread misconception that America had placed some kind of broader trade embargo on Indonesia. However, checking international terrorism has been the main impetus to find a way to partially restore military-to-military ties, even in the face of some important opposition in the U.S. Congress. Deputy Defense Secretary and former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, has stated that the best way to ensure Indonesia's stability is to influence its military. The Bush administration in early 2002 asked Congress to approve a startup budget of US\$8 million for military-to-military links. When Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Indonesia in August 2002, he announced US\$50 million in assistance to the security forces, half of which was earmarked for the police. Powell made explicit mention of reforming law enforcement at this time. Given that a small number of *jihadi* can move through Indonesia, the breakdown of state capacity to enforce law and order remains an outstanding problem. Any assistance that can be given to both proper policing methods and the court system would go to the core of the problem.

Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Thomas Fargo, has announced a plan to establish a small number of "Counterterrorism Fellowships" for TNI officers, to be taken up at either the Center for Civil/Military Relations or the Naval Postgraduate School. These courses, according to Admiral Fargo, would entail modules on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.

None of these plans to restore links have been undertaken without reservation. The U.S. State Department's annual human rights reports on Indonesia contain less than flattering remarks about Indonesia's security forces. An extract from the introduction to the report for 2002 makes it plain:

The government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit serious abuses. Soldiers and police murdered, tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained both civilians and members of separatist movements. [...] Security force members also committed severe abuses in other conflict zones such as Papua, the Moluccas, and Central Sulawesi, but at reduced levels compared with the previous year. In Papua members of the TNI and the Brimob committed assaults, rapes, and supported militias, which raised fears of interreligious conflict.¹⁶

In the words of the U.S. Ambassador, Ralph Boyce, at the time of Powell's announcement of aid: "If this [military-to-military relations] comes to pass, this does not represent a clean bill of health for past TNI actions which continue to be of concern to us."¹⁷ Admiral Fargo has stated that the military-to-military programme is designed to encourage "reform" and "accountability", and to enhance "professional capabilities"¹⁸ — a clear signal from the United States that the TNI has a long way to go. Statements like this from U.S. government officials give the strong impression that dealing with Indonesia's security forces is quite a dilemma. Officials have continued to stress to Indonesia that they expect improvements in human rights for the restoration of IMET. Secretary Powell told the U.S. Senate on 30 April 2002 that it was the administration's desire to encourage Indonesia to avoid a repetition of the 1999 East Timor disaster in Aceh.

In striving to work out a means to work with the Indonesian security forces, the Bush administration faces a formidable obstacle in its own Congress. The Leahy Amendment, namely that U.S. defence personnel cannot train with units that have committed human rights abuses, imposes an additional legal restraint. In June 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee blocked the release of US\$600,000 until justice is found in the Timika case. Mrs Spier, widow of one victim of the Timika attack, Ricky Spier, met with members of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee prior to the vote. After this meeting the Committee voted unanimously to block funds earmarked for the training of Indonesian officers.¹⁹ The Bush administration will struggle to overcome such strong opposition in Congress, and this closes down available options for cooperation.

The practice of the United States to link military aid to domestic and military reforms has not gone down well with the TNI itself. TNI commander, Lieutenant General Endriartono Sutarto, has insisted that military aid “should not involve interference in our national affairs.”²⁰ Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, warned in September 2003 that congressional opposition to military-to-military relations will undermine bilateral relations between Indonesia and the U.S. Indonesia, despite its preference for U.S. equipment, has also seriously considered the purchase of alternative sources of weapons. In June 2003, Megawati created a minor scandal, known as “Sukhoigate” (which soon blew over), when she announced a deal with Russia to purchase, at the cost of US\$197 million, four Sukhoi fighters, and two Mi-35 assault helicopters. The deal, which apparently bypassed the Indonesian Ministry of Defence, is a clear attempt by the Megawati administration to find weapons sources that are not so fussy about human rights standards.

The War in Iraq

Anger at the U.S. again brewed in Indonesia in early 2003, this time over plans to invade Iraq. Although Indonesia called on Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, to open up to U.N. weapons inspectors, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirayuda, publicly poured cold water on U.S. claims of Iraqi intransigence, saying that the intelligence offered so far was less than adequate and that the work of the UN weapons inspectors was incomplete. As expected, Indonesia consistently opposed a U.S.-led attack that fell outside the UN process. On 20 March 2003, Megawati released a statement plainly stating that Indonesia “strongly deplores unilateral action against Iraq.”²¹ Equally, Indonesia has long been an opponent of sanctions against Iraq, which were imposed after the 1990–91 Gulf War. During Abdurrahman Wahid’s term as head of state, the president made a visit to Iraq and used the occasion to champion the repeal of the sanctions regime — a longstanding element of Indonesian foreign policy. Reports of the plight of the Iraqi people under sanctions were well-known in Indonesia, and count as a source of anger against the United States. An Indonesian foreign affairs

spokesman told the BBC that while the government has faced domestic opposition on many foreign policy issues in the past, on the issue of Iraq, the government was in complete accord with public sentiment.²²

One of the issues that emerged from the war in Iraq, for Indonesia, was the whole issue of “pre-emption” and “intervention”. The Indonesian government itself is probably not alarmed by any potential incursion from U.S. forces onto Indonesian soil. In fact, when Australian Prime Minister John Howard announced, in the wake of the Bali bombing, that Australia would adopt the right to strike outside its territory to defend Australia, both the Indonesian Vice President, Hamzah Haz, and Foreign Minister, Nur Hassan Wirajuda, stated in a press conference in early December 2002 that Australia’s “plan to attack neighbouring countries” was merely rhetoric — albeit somewhat alarmist. The Megawati administration has never argued that the United States (or Australia) poses a traditional military threat to Indonesian territory. The primary concern over the Iraq intervention is what it means for state sovereignty and the way in which U.S. global actions will play out with the wider masses in Indonesia — whose power, when exercised, still causes considerable angst for Jakarta’s political élite.

Public sentiment over Iraq explains much about Indonesia’s reaction to Iraq. What is significant is that Indonesian officials made it clear that Indonesia would have accepted a second United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution — a resolution that was not forthcoming. An important question to consider is why a UNSC approved resolution for war in Iraq would have been more palatable than U.S. unilateralist “preemption”. A UN stamp of approval over Iraq would have made it easier to present to the Indonesian public, given that such a broad section of the public was opposed to the war. It is important to note, however, that Indonesia’s mainstream Muslim groups, NU and Muhammadiyah, not only rejected Osama bin Laden’s call for violent opposition to the United States, but urged their followers to regard Iraq as a political, and not religious, struggle. Megawati, and some members of her cabinet, in opposing the Iraq War, made the same point that the conflict should not be seen in confessional terms. However, the fear, publicly expressed by both civic and religious leaders in Indonesia (and elsewhere in Southeast Asia), was that war in Iraq would lead many Southeast Asian Muslims to view the conflict as being essentially religious in nature.

Commentators across Indonesia’s political spectrum condemned U.S. plans to invade Iraq. A sampling of more liberal voices gives some indication as to the depth of feeling. The respected magazine

Tempo urged its readers to ponder the death and maiming of innocent civilians when buying Coca-Cola or some similar American product, but urged readers not to utilize violence against places selling American products or against American citizens themselves.²³ In the same issue of *Tempo*, one of Indonesia's most respected analytical columnists, Goenawan Mohamad, pondered over why the U.S. felt that Iraq was a threat.²⁴ He concludes that it is a convergence of the defence industry, Christian fundamentalism, and the need for the Bush administration to concoct a foreign devil. Despite the U.S. ambassador's explanations to the Indonesian public, through the media, that the U.S. was "liberating" Iraq, Nurcholish Madjid, one of Indonesia's most respected neo-modernist Islamic scholars and noted advocate of pluralism and democracy, termed the U.S. action in Iraq as an act of "aggression".

Official Indonesian government commentary on Iraq did little to alert the public to the horrors of Saddam Hussein's regime. For example, the Indonesian Ambassador to Baghdad, Dachlan Abdul Hamied, praised Saddam's intellectual ability in an interview and added that: "Saddam Hussien is a benevolent person. That's what makes Iraqis so willing to die for Saddam. His policies are seen to be pro-people."²⁵ The ambassador, in particular, praised Saddam for not lifting utility prices (somewhat reminiscent of the praise heaped on Mussolini's train schedule). When the interviewer asked about Saddam's execution of his sons-in-law, Dachlan Abdul Hamied replied, "I don't think that is cruel, just firm".

Reactions to the war in Iraq demonstrate a need for Washington to lift its image. But this is no easy task. In November 2002 the U.S. State Department purchased two minute slots on Indonesian television for film clips on Muslims living in the U.S. The point of these advertisements was for American Muslims to talk about their lives in the United States, and, in particular, their freedom to practice their faith. Although it is difficult to assess the overall impact, newspaper columnists pointed out that the advertisements may not have much impact because they are perceived as U.S. propaganda. There have also been rumours emanating from Washington that some U.S. officials have argued for direct funding of moderate Islamic groups like NU and Muhammadiyah. In fact, at the time of Secretary Powell's visit in 2002, Muslim leaders such as Azyumardi Azra, rector of Jakarta's State Islamic University, and Syafi'i Maarif, chairman of Muhammadiyah, urged the U.S. to fund moderate Muslim organizations instead of the security forces as a means of influencing Muslim opinion. Such direct funding would, however, backfire, in that it would

seriously tarnish the credibility of the moderate organizations. If moderate Islamic leaders are to be influential, it is important that they are seen to be independent of foreign funding sources.

Stability and Human Rights

A debate that has emerged in Indonesia in the aftermath of the J.W. Marriott explosion (5 August 2003) is whether or not to restore something like the old Anti-Subversion Law in order to deal with terrorist groups. Such a law, used in the past to imprison political activists and radical Muslim leaders, is still greatly unpopular with the public and raises the ghost of the Suharto regime. Yet key Indonesian officials have drawn a dichotomy between freedom and stability. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has spoken generally of the possible need to put human rights on the backburner in the interests of community safety. The national intelligence chief, Abdullah Hendropriyono, has advocated that powers of arrest be given to the intelligence services. The Defence Minister, Matori Abdul Djalil has stated: "Several times Indonesia has been attacked by an act of terrorism which causes a loss of life. Therefore it's an emergency. That's why I am brave to say this nation actually needs an Internal Security Act which provides authority to the security apparatus to take preventative measures before terrorist attacks take place."²⁶ The subtext of this discussion is obvious. Indonesian officials will often argue privately that the United States has created tension by insisting on human rights standards while insisting equally on clamping down on suspected terrorists — even in the absence of courtroom evidence.

Nonetheless, even after the realization that Indonesia was a critical link for the U.S. war on terrorism, the United States has continued to press for improvements in human rights as well as improvements in Indonesia's democratization. In August 2002, the U.S. State Department expressed disappointment over the Ad Hoc Human Rights Trials for East Timor stating that the trials had failed to utilize fully resources and evidence available.²⁷ Although U.S. officials have declined to comment on the substance of the trials themselves, or specific verdicts, Indonesia's trials for East Timor have generally been at odds with the accepted account of what occurred in the territory in 1999. The TNI officers found guilty (and currently free on appeal) were convicted on grounds of negligence. The court never accepted that elements of the TNI had organized militia violence, merely that they had failed in their duty to stop it. The U.S. has also exerted pressure over the trials for TNI officers involved in the assassination of Papuan leader, Theys Eluay (who was

killed in 2001). In more recent times, Indonesia's sentencing of the Acehese political dissident, Muhammad Nazar, to five years in jail, earned a high level rebuke from the United States. The State Department, Richard Boucher, stated that the U.S. "regrets" the verdict, and expressed concern that this is part of a pattern: "This is the latest in a series of convictions and prison sentences for peaceful expression of antigovernment views in Indonesia."²⁸

A statement by President Bush, at the time of the signing of Aceh's Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), in December 2002, commended the Megawati government and the people of Aceh for "choosing the path of reconciliation over the path of violence."²⁹ But the peace process did not last and Jakarta launched a major military campaign in the province. This provoked some public criticism from Washington. Wolfowitz repeated the earlier statements of U.S. government officials (including that of Ambassador Boyce), over the situation in Aceh, arguing that the military solution would not work — as Aceh cannot be quelled with military force.³⁰ While recognizing Indonesia's sovereign territory — an important preface for any U.S. official referring to Aceh — the Deputy Secretary urged that a "political solution" be found for the problem.³¹ This essentially means that the United States would prefer a resumption of the negotiated settlement and an end of the heavy handed military campaign. Wolfowitz went further and recommended that Indonesia reopen the province to NGOs.

The Aceh case illustrates another source of consternation between Washington and Jakarta. While the U.S. government has officially designated Jemaah Islamiyah a terrorist organization, Indonesia has been unsuccessful in getting the U.S. to put the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) on Washington's official list. Attempts by Jakarta to label the rebellion in Aceh as "Islamic" and a case of "terrorism", and thus draw the link to the current U.S. war against "Islamic terrorism", have not found fertile ground in Washington. This has clearly disappointed Indonesian officials. Jakarta's main stated objection to U.S. policy on terrorism is that Washington will only classify groups as "terrorist" within a narrow set of circumstances. While U.S. officials are not blind to atrocities committed by GAM, they are aware that the Indonesian military is also guilty of ignoring human rights (see the various U.S. State Department's human rights reports) and that the military "solution" has often backfired. Aceh is seen by Washington as primarily a separatist struggle and not linked to the goals of Al-Qaeda. If Washington were to formally back the Indonesian military operation against "terrorists" in Aceh, there is a risk that this will alienate the Acehese people and anger the GAM organization that is currently not linked to the Al-Qaeda "jihad" against western interests.

Jakarta's main objection relates precisely to this point — that the United States will only classify a group as “terrorist” if it directly threatens U.S. interests. The Indonesian government continues to maintain that while Al-Qaeda is worthy of condemnation, there is a double standard in the U.S. policy.

However, the U.S. has, in Indonesia's case, been careful about use of the terrorist label. For example, extremist Islamist groups like Laskar Jihad and FPI are not listed as such. (Not that there is any pressure from Jakarta to do so.) In an interview, Wolfowitz was asked if Laskar Jihad was a terrorist organization. He answered that:

I think the simple answer to “is it a terrorist organization?” is no. It is an organization that has engaged in some disruptive activity? I think the answer to that is yes. I know there are some Indonesians who very much don't like that sort of activity, who nevertheless feel they [Laskar Jihad] act more out of ignorance and more out of reaction to the difficult economic and social conditions in the country than out of a deep-seated sort of malice. ... I know Indonesians whose opinions I respect a lot who think these people could be educated and persuaded to a different course of action. That's the reason why it's very difficult for people operating from the distance ... to step into the middle of a country and make those kinds of judgments.³²

Laskar Jihad's operations in Ambon and elsewhere were, of course, more than just “disruptive”. They are guilty of abuses against non-combatants. However the point is that the United States has taken great care in the case of Indonesia to reserve the “terrorist” label for Al-Qaeda linked individuals and groups in order to avoid being seen to support government actions (in the case of Aceh) or simply adding sundry Islamic groups to the list of terrorist groups (in the case of Ambon).

That the U.S. must tread carefully in relation to Indonesia's regional problems is seen in the often expressed concern about the possibility that Western power may break Indonesia up. President Megawati has recently blamed foreign influences for fanning the flames of separatism in both Aceh and Papua.³³ This fear is also expressed by parliamentarians, and is often directed primarily at Australia — due to events in East Timor, and the role of many Australian citizens in Papua — but the United States is sometimes cast in the supporting role. The threat cited by many nationalist politicians is not military, but one of “soft power” influences from non-governmental organization (NGO) groups in the West. (Although some more far-fetched scenarios see the hidden agendas of various Western governments in all of this.) Indonesia's primary security concern revolves around the separatist

movements in Aceh and Papua, and in order to counter the influence of NGOs, Indonesia has invested a great deal of diplomatic time and energy into assurances from the United States, and the rest of the international community, that it respects the sovereign territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

The Importance of Indonesia

The bomb blast at the Marriott hotel in Jakarta on 5 August 2003 was a dramatic demonstration that the *jihadi* threat still exists in Indonesia.³⁴ Although such radical versions of political Islam remain extremely weak politically (in fact, groups advocating violence enjoy no parliamentary representation), small numbers can create a lot of physical damage. The concern of the United States is not that large numbers of Indonesian Muslims will be attracted to Osama bin Laden's ideas, but that they will continue to explain away terrorist incidents as the work of foreign agents, or perhaps the TNI, rather than of a homegrown terrorist organization. Wolfowitz is on record as saying that while Jakarta is more serious about the terrorist problem after the Bali blast, "far too many Indonesians" are yet to accept that there is a threat from terrorists.³⁵

To date, it can be seen that the Indonesian government has made progress as far as Washington is concerned. Of the nearly 130 JI operatives arrested in Southeast Asia, around 100 are in jail in Indonesia. Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, told a BBC interviewer in September 2003 that despite international protests over the light sentence for JI spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Indonesia had not only rounded up larger numbers of terrorists than its neighbours but had successfully prosecuted the operatives in the Bali blast case under the due process of law.³⁶ He did express regret that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's sentence was too lenient — Ba'asyir received a four-year sentence, given the paucity of evidence of his direct involvement in acts of terror, but is currently free on appeal. The arrest of Hambali (an Indonesian citizen) on 11 August 2003 in Thailand, where he was apparently planning to target Bangkok's APEC meeting, was another breakthrough in undermining JI's Indonesia network. However it does create a potential problem — so far Indonesian authorities have not had access to Hambali.

The United States has encouraged Indonesia to enter into a series of bilateral and multilateral partnerships in order to counter JI's regional linkages. The ASEAN Counter-terrorism Training Centre in Kuala Lumpur, established on 1st July 2003, has been cited by U.S. officials as a good example. Indonesia has entered into a number of multilateral understandings on intelligence sharing and information exchange

with its ASEAN partners. Peer pressure from key ASEAN neighbours has undoubtedly played a part in Indonesia's current prosecution of terrorist cells.

As mentioned earlier, it is clear that Indonesia has assumed a new prominence in Washington. Indonesia is considered a critical test case in the war against terrorism — not just as a “model of moderation” but as a country of concern. No one in the Bush administration is suggesting that Indonesia will find common cause with bin Laden, but it is Indonesia's state capacity that has U.S. officials worried. Wolfowitz mentioned to the press in early 2002 that, after Afghanistan, the U.S. would focus on denying “sanctuary” to terrorists groups, and specifically mentioned Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, and the Philippines.³⁷ The U.S. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (February 2003) talks of terrorists seeking out states, post Afghanistan, that lack the capacity to curb their activities.³⁸ It also addresses the “underlying conditions” that allow terrorists to find sanctuary, which equally applies to Indonesia:

At the base, underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Some of these conditions are real and some manufactured. Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support. The belief that terror is a legitimate means to address such conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem enabling terrorism to develop and grow.³⁹

The document also notes that a solution to the Palestinian issue is most pressing in terms of appeasing Muslim feelings, which in Indonesia's case is arguably the issue that could most influence public opinion about the intentions of U.S. foreign policy.

According to Wolfowitz and others, the intention of JI is to see democracy fail.⁴⁰ Official statements from the Bush administration lead to the conclusion that Indonesia, as Wolfowitz's “model of moderation”, is a torch bearer for democracy and secularism within the Muslim world. The trouble with Indonesia is that, while it is a leading example of secular government, it has not always been the most ideal role model for good governance across the board. The Bush administration will continue to look at ways to foster stronger cohesion, even if the prospects for this are limited.

Conclusion: Implications for the Bilateral Relationship

Indonesia has not been noted for its anti-Americanism in the past, but this phenomenon has reared its head more strongly during the past few years. Although certain political leaders and media sources have

attempted to make political capital out of this, there is little evidence that the Megawati administration has in any way attempted to fan anti-U.S. sentiment. In fact successive governments in Indonesia have attempted to keep this under wraps to some extent. The primary drivers of this new anti-Americanism are impressions that the U.S. seeks to weaken Islam, and mistrust based on U.S. activities regarding developments in Indonesia itself. For example, suspicions have always lingered about CIA involvement in Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s. It is not wholly surprising, therefore, that there is disbelief in Indonesia over evidence released by American sources about Al-Qaeda links in Indonesia. After the Bali blast, rumours of CIA involvement to tarnish Islam were rife and openly reported in daily newspapers.

Despite substantial advances by the Indonesian government in attempting to dismantle terrorist cells, the blast in Bali and at the Marriott hotel, on Indonesian soil, have so far failed to completely convince the Indonesian public of the dangers that radical groups pose. Added to this is the widespread perception that U.S. foreign policy is co-religionist to the extent that America will conduct humanitarian intervention to save Christian populations, but not Muslims (a misconception based almost entirely on the experiences of East Timor and Palestine). Thus, many see the global war against terrorism as a part of a wider anti-Islamic strategy. Given these attitudes, Indonesian public opinion makes it difficult for the Indonesian government to unequivocally support U.S. foreign policy. It is out of the question that Washington could have realistically expected support from Jakarta for its military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, the Indonesian government consistently urged that the U.S. find a peaceful, and multilateral, solution to the Iraq crisis, and has issued justifiable warnings that a unilateral action will see a public backlash amongst the Indonesian public. While the invasion of Iraq further complicated U.S.-Indonesia relations in the lead up to that conflict, the swiftness of the war enables relations to return to a degree of normalcy.

These circumstances explain how public criticism by the United States of Indonesia's apparent failures to check terrorism would be entirely counter-productive. The U.S. will have to exercise patience and caution with the Megawati administration, which is potentially vulnerable to domestic opponents who have already tried to exploit anti-American sentiment. While avoiding megaphone diplomacy, Washington will have to remain content with assisting and encouraging Jakarta from behind the scenes. This would follow the pattern already set by U.S. officials. The Megawati government cannot possibly stand if it is perceived to be constantly caving in to foreign pressure, *especially* from the United States.

“Winning hearts and minds”, an old cliché, is often cited as being important for the United States to win the war against international terrorism. This is no more evident than in the case of Indonesia, largely a moderate Muslim country, where distrust of U.S. policy has been a real obstacle to closer Indonesian-U.S. relations. But Washington’s ability to appeal to ordinary Indonesians is limited. Convincing Indonesians to take the threat seriously may rest with their own community leaders. One positive development since the Bali and Marriott bombings has been the move by the most important Muslim groups, particularly NU and Muhammadiyah, to denounce groups that use violence. Both NU and Muhammadiyah issued joint statements after each terrorist incident to denounce violence in the name of religion. In encouraging such developments, the power of the U.S. is limited — after all it is the messenger, and not just the message, that is critical in this case. If important Muslim clerics are to voice their opposition to the radical fringe, their independence from the U.S. will be important for them to carry any credibility. The struggle within Indonesia over the war against terrorism has been ongoing since September 11. Yet the Bali blast (and quiet international pressure) has tipped the balance of power in favour of the moderate political élite and mainstream Muslim organizations. The upshot of this has been the arrest of key JI suspects, as well as the arrest of Laskar Jihad’s leadership and its disbandment.

Military-to-military relations, a political minefield in the United States, could actually help improve America’s stock within Indonesia — although congressional approval cannot be taken for granted. Not only do some Indonesian NGO activists argue that U.S. military contact with the TNI might be the only way to see change (however slow) within Indonesia’s praetorian military, the Indonesian public would respond well to the removal of sanctions imposed after East Timor. As is well recognized in Washington, however, military-to-military ties must be balanced against other objectives, principally preserving (and furthering) democracy and improving human rights.

In the final analysis, the Bali blast in particular has seen a government in Jakarta which is more attentive to the problem of terrorism, but the Megawati government still faces major constraints on the type of support it can give to the U.S. The Indonesian political élite has been divided on how best to respond to the terrorist threat, but in the aftermath of the Bali blast, key members of the Indonesian government have shown more resolve. On balance, the attack on Indonesian soil gives the Megawati government more political ability to act against radical groups. However, a substantial body of opinion in Indonesia remains to be convinced that Indonesia faces a problem of international terrorism — principally in the form of Jemaah Islamiyah — inside its own borders.

NOTES

1. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
2. "Wolfowitz: Countering the Dallas Perception", *Laksamana*, 17 May 2002. (The title of this article refers to a remark Wolfowitz gave that many in Indonesia have had their views of America shaped by watching the popular 1980s television serial *Dallas*.) Wolfowitz has a well known affinity for Indonesia. For example, in relation to Indonesia's terrorism problem he once said: "If Indonesians don't do something to stop terrorism in Indonesia, it's going to have terrible consequences for democracy in that wonderful, important country that I love so much." "No. 2 Pentagon official says Indonesia must act against terrorists", *Associated Press*, 5 November 2002.
3. See Anthony L. Smith, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 3 (December 2000): 498-526.
4. "RI Calls on U.S. to Reopen its Embassy", *Jakarta Post*, 4 November 2000, p. 1.
5. See *Pew Global Attitudes Projects*, "What the World Thinks in 2002", 4 December 2002 — this report shows that two-thirds are opposed to the U.S. response.
6. Heri Retnowati, "Interview — Indonesian Muslim Chief Warns U.S. of Backlash", *Reuters*, 27 September 2001.
7. See "Jew Conspiracy Rumours Rampant", *Reuters*, 17 October 2001.
8. The term *jihad* in Islam simply means to "struggle". The Indonesia Council of Ulama failed to clarify what they meant by *jihad*, which is usually interpreted as meaning "holy war" in the West.
9. "Megawati Off to U.S. Amid Controversy Over Deputy's Remarks", *Associated Press*, 17 September 2001.
10. Taken from CIA documents seen by *Time*. See "Confessions of an al-Qaeda Terrorist", *Time*, 15 September 2002.
11. "Rachmawati: 'Rumors Disseminated by CIA are Like Rumors Disseminated Prior to G30S/PKI'", *Tempo Interactive*, 20 September 2002. It should be noted that Rachmawati is a political opponent of Megawati, even to the extent of publicly condemning her sister's ascension to the presidency in 2001.
12. Raymond Bonner, "Indonesians Distrust Report by C.I.A. on Qaeda Suspect", *New York Times*, 24 September 2002.
13. Singapore's Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, also made the inference in various speeches that growing Islamic piety in the region posed a danger. Many in Indonesia saw this as an explicit linkage between Islam and terrorism. "Indonesia says rift with Singapore due to differing perceptions", *Jakarta Post*, 25 February 2002.
14. See for example "Testimony to Senate Armed Service Committee for Adm. Fargo's confirmation as PACOM", 26 April 2002, <<http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2002/fargoconfirmation.pdf>>.
15. See Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "Press Stakeout Following Bilateral Meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Shihab", Bangkok, Thailand, 29 July 2000. Released by the U.S. State Department.
16. *Indonesia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — 2002*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. 31 March 2003. <www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm>.
17. "U.S. Ambassador: Aid To Indonesia Military To Support Reform", *Associated Press*, 7 August 2002.
18. Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Press Conference, Jakarta, Indonesia, 15 August 2002. <www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2002/020815fargo2.htm>.

19. "U.S. Steers Indonesia away from War against Separatists", *New York Times*, 30 May 2003.
20. "Mega installs Endriartono as TNI Chief to Replace Widodo", *Jakarta Post*, 8 June 2002.
21. "Indonesia Strongly Deplores Unilateral Action against Iraq", Megawati Soekarnoputri, 20 March 2003. Accessed from Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, <www.deplu.go.id>.
22. BBC Radio, World Service, East Asia, 14 February 2003.
23. "Moral Opposition", *Tempo*, 7 April 2003, p. 10.
24. Goenawan Mohamad, "America", *Tempo*, 7 April 2003.
25. "Dachlan Abdul Hamied, 'Saddam is an Intelligent Manager'", *Tempo*, 7 April 2003, p. 33.
26. Matthew Moore, "Human Rights the Next Casualty?", *The Age*, 16 August 2003.
27. "U.S. Disappointed by East Timor Verdicts", *Laksamana*, 20 August 2002.
28. Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, "U.S. Regrets Verdict on Aceh Activist", *Jakarta Post*, 4 July 2003.
29. Statement by the President, The White House, December 2002.
30. "U.S. Steers Indonesia away from War against Separatists", *New York Times*, 30 May 2003.
31. "Transcript: Wolfowitz Says Terrorists Don't Want Indonesian Democracy", *Washington File*, 30 May 2003.
32. Interview with Paul Wolfowitz in "Active Engagement: U.S.-Indonesia Relations", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9 no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 5-6.
33. Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, "Foreigners Fanned Separatism: Megawati", *Jakarta Post*, 24 September 2003.
34. After the Marriott blast the U.S. embassy announced aid of US\$500,000 towards medical aid, including ten million Indonesian rupiah per victim. The majority of the victims were Indonesians.
35. "RI must Stop Denying Presence of Terrorists, says Wolfowitz", *Jakarta Post*, 8 November 2002.
36. Quoted in "Nearly 100 Terror Suspects Arrested: Foreign Minister", *Jakarta Post*, 22 September 2003.
37. "After Afghanistan, US Likely to Focus on Indonesia, Philippines: Wolfowitz", Agence France Presse, 8 January 2002.
38. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, White House, (February 2003), p. 8.
39. *Ibid*, p. 6.
40. "Transcript: Wolfowitz Says Terrorists Don't Want Indonesian Democracy", *Washington File*, 30 May 2003.